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KAROLYN KING NELSON*
HINKLE, COX, EATON, COFFIELD & HENSLEY, L.L.P.

Takings Law West of the Pecos:
Inverse Condemnation of Federal Oil
and Gas Lease Rights
I. INTRODUCTION-INVERSE CONDEMNATION OF FEDERAL
OIL AND GAS LEASE RIGHTS-WHAT'S ALL THE FUSS
The United States Constitution provides that "private property
[shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation."' In
Pennsylvania Coal2 the United States Supreme Court first recognized that
government regulation could in effect "take" property requiring the
payment of just compensation.3 The Court held that "while property may
be regulated to a certain extent, if the regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking."4 The award for the "regulatory taking" of property
under the Fifth Amendment has been summarized as being "designed to
bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."'
Since Pennsylvania Coal, courts have struggled to identify when
permissible regulation necessitates payment of just compensation.
Advocates desiring to protect private property rights from governmental
interference and advocates of more comprehensive regulation to control the
use and development of property in the United States have squared off over

* Karolyn King Nelson, Esq., Hinkle, Cox, Eaton, Coffield & Hensley, L.LP., Roswell,
New Mexico; copyright 0 1997 Natural Resources Journal; Karolyn King Nelson.
This article is dedicated to my new son Ian and husband Chico without whose support
it would not have been possible. I would also like to thank the firm of Hinkle, Cox, Eaton,
Coffield & Hensley, LLP. and the lawyers in the Roswell office for their encouragement of my
interest in regulatory takings. Last, but not least, I want to applaud litigants such as Bass
Enterprises, Enron Oil and Gas Co., Fred G. Yates and others like them who call the United
States to account for its decisions.
1. U.S. CoNsr. amend. V.
2. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
3. See Store Saft Redlands Ass'n v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 726, 729 (1996) where the
Court explains in detail physical, legal and regulatory takings summarizing a regulatory
taking as one that "involves the imposition upon the private property of some government
condition, generally limiting or prohibiting beneficial use by the private owner,'
4. PennsylvaniaCoal, 260 U.S. at 415.
5. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,48 (1960).
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the issue of compensation. 6 Recent opinions from the United States Supreme
Court, Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and Court of Federal Claims
have intensified this debate.'
To complicate matters, in the context of a federal oil and gas lease,
the chief regulator controlling the use and development of the property is
simultaneously the mineral lessor. It is not surprising, therefore, that once
a lease has been issued, the federal government becomes much more
synonymous with the "public" than with private mineral lessors. Decisions
to prevent or severely restrict development of the lease can cause the lessee
to bear the sole financial burden associated with such decisions. More
importantly, when the debate shifts to a larger discourse concerning
whether to develop mineral resources on public lands, the government's
ability to function as the chief regulator in the public's interest can easily
blur the line between its co-existent legal obligations as mineral
lessor/grantor of real property rights conveyed by an oil and gas lease.
Even so, the goal to protect the public good cannot singly justify
governmental action resulting in an uncompensated taking of property.8
Similarly, government inaction in the face of controversy relating to a plan
of development cannot indefinitely forestall all beneficial use of property. 9
While a typical taking occurs when the government condemns property
under its power of eminent domain, the doctrine of "inverse condemnation"
6. See Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descentand Resurrection,1987 SUP.CT. REV. 1 (1987);
James L Huffman, Judge Plager's"Sea Change" in Regulatory Takings Law, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL.
LJ.597 (1995); James L Huffman, Lucas; A Small Step in the Right Direction, 23 ENVTL L. 901
(1993); Jan G. Laitos, Causationand the UnconstitutionalConditions Doctrine:Why the City of
Tigard's Exaction was a Taking, 72 DENv. U. L. REv. 893 (1995); Jan G. Laitos, The Public Use
Paradox and the Takings Clause, 13 J.ENERGY NAT. RsOURCES & ENvmL L. 9 (1993); see also
Richard Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources.
Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOwA L. REv. 631 (1986); Maria Mansfield, lhen
"Private- Rights Meet "Public- Rights: The Problem of Labeling and Regulatory Takings, 65 U.
COLO.L REV. 193 (1994); Jan G. Laitos & Richard A. Westphal, Government Interference with
PrivateInterests and Public Resources, 11 HARV. ENvrL.L. REv. 1 (1987); Glenn P. Sugameli,
Takings Issues in Light ofLucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A DecisionFull of Sound and
Fury Signifying Nothing,12 VA. ENVTL UJ. 439 (1993); Michael Allen Wolf, Overtakingthe Fifth
Amendment: The Legislative Backlash Against Environmentalism, 6 FORDHAM ENvTL. L.J. 637
(1995).
7. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Kaiser Aetna
v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1992); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419 (1982); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980);
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Florida Rock Indus.,
Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (regulatory takings analysis); Hendler v.
United States, 952 F.2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (physical takings analysis); Hage v. United
States, 35 Fed. Ct. C. 147 (1996); Store Safe Redlands Assoc. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 726
(1996) (legal takings analysis).
8. See Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560,1571 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
9. See, e.g., Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 10 F.3d 796, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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recognizes that a taking may also occur without the initiation of formal
proceedings. 10 The "self-executing character of the constitutional provision
with respect to compensation" entitles a property owner to bring an action
in inverse condemnation when government action effects a taking of
property rights.1
It is important to note that the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit
the "taking" of property either physically, through regulation, or through
legal transformation. 2 Neither does it transform the judge into a "super
legislator or executive, intent on preventing regulation that'goes too far." 13
Rather, when deciding a takings claim,
[t]he job of the court is to deal with a concrete claim, by an
aggrieved person or persons, that their constitutional rights
under the Fifth Amendment have been violated by some
governmental action. The court must proceed to analyze this
claim, as any other legal claim, regardless of the consequences
to governmental policy. Unless property right claims are to be
given lesser due process than other claimed constitutional
violations, the court must interpret the words of the
as it would any other language
constitutional protection
14
conferring rights.
As with any other "rights" based analysis required by the
Constitution, the determination that "property rights" merit constitutional
protection is a determination that limits the regulatory power of
government in favor of the individual property owner. This premise must
hold true even when the United States is the grantor. The principle must
guide the analysis of regulatory takings of federal oil and gas lease rights,
because it is the constitutional guarantee of just compensation that keeps the
United States' role as regulator from wholly eroding its obligations as
mineral lessor.

10. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304,315
(1987).
11. Id. at 305,315.
12. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304.
"As its language indicates, and as the Court has frequently noted, this provision does not
prohibit the taking of property, but instead places a condition on the exercise of that power.
This basic understanding of the [Fifth] Amendment makes clear that it is designed not to
limit the governmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure
compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking. Thus,
government action that works a taking of property rights necessarily implicates the
'constitutional obligation to pay just compensation.'" Id. at 314-15 (citations omitted).
13. Hage v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl., at 150.
14. Id. at 150-51.
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This article considers these roles in the context of regulatory takings
and the related government liability. It outlines the prima facie elements of
a takings case and discusses the impact of such precedent, developed
largely outside the context of federal oil and gas lease rights, on those
property interests. It also highlights some of the most recent arguments
used by both lessees and the United States in connection with regulatory
decisions impacting specific lease rights and recent cases brought by lessees
seeking just compensation. Finally, it concludes that the United States' role
as regulator cannot constitutionally be used to defeat its obligations as
mineral lessor.

I.

ESTABLISHING A PROTECTABLE PROPERTY INTEREST

A. Oil and Gas Leasing on Federal Lands
The oil and gas minerals owned by the United States are leased
pursuant to the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 (MLA).15 The MLA vests
authority for issuing leases with the Secretary of Interior, 6 who in turn has
delegated all authority for onshore minerals management, except related to
royalty management, to the Bureau of Land Management (BLM).' 7 Present
day leasing must also substantively comply with the Federal Land Policy
Management Act of 1978 (FLPMA),5 and procedurally comply with the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). 19 These three statutes,
along with other federal statutes relating to protection or conservation of

15. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1994). The Mineral Leasing Act replaced the claim location
system, as to oil and gas, with procedures for permitting and leasing. In comparison to the
absence of federal control of mining claims patented under the General Mining Laws, the
Mineral Leasing Act requires lessees to pay rentals and royalties to the United States as the
lessor-landowner and to adhere to standards established by the Secretary of the Interior for
oil and gas operations. The Act governs those lands designated as 'public domain." Public
domain lands are those lands or mineral deposits owned by the United States which have
not been disposed of under any of the public land laws. See generally 1 James M. Piccone,

History, the Government Surey and Basic Oil and Gas Leasing Legislation, LAw OF FEDERAL OIL
AND GAS LEASES (1996).

16. See 43 U.S.C. § 1201 (1994) (stating that 'The Secretary of the Interior, or such officer
as he may designate, is authorized to enforce and carry into execution, by appropriate
regulations, every part of the provisions of this [Title 43] not otherwise specially provided
for); Best v. Humbolt Placer Mining Co., 371 US. 334,336 (1963); Ryan Outdoor Adver., Inc.
v. United States, 559 F.2d 554,556 (9th Cir. 1977).
17. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181, 286(A) (1994); McLelenna v. Wilbur, 283 U.S. 414, 419 (1931);
McDonald v. Clark, 771 F.2d 460,462 (10th Cir. 1985). Responsibility for royalty management
under MLA has been delegated to the Minerals Management Service. Transfer of Mineral
Management Functions, 48 Fed. Reg. 8983 (1983).

18. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1994).
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321,4331-4335,4341-4347(1994).
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various resource values, influence how BLM carries out its charge to
administer all federal minerals and the surface resources on the public
lands? Within limits, leasing by the BLM is discretionary and the agency,
assuming it follows proper procedural guidelines, may refuse to lease an
entire region or decline to issue a lease for a particular location.? The
decision to lease, however, is an extremely important one because it
commits the subject lands to mineral development.2
B. Lease Rights Granted
Most leases are issued as the result of a competitive lease sale.?2
Prior to the lease sale, BLM posts a listing of the tracts to be sold along with
any restrictions to be imposed through stipulations attached at the time of
lease issuance.' By regulation, stipulations become part of the lease and
supersede inconsistent provisions of the standard lease form.' As
consideration for the lease, the successful bidder pays up front a lease
20. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1994); National Historic
Preservation Act, id. §§ 470-470n, Wilderness Act of 1964, id. §§ 1131-1136.
21. "Where federal lands are not closed to leasing by statutory exception, prior
appropriation, or by formal withdrawal or reservation, the Secretary of the Interior may still
exercise his discretionary authority to refuse to lease public lands for oil and gas
development." 1 C.M. Peterson, Lands Availablefor Leasing, LAW OF FEDERAL OIL AND GAS
LEASING 3-83 (1996). The Secretary's discretion is guided by the public interest but can not
be exercised in a manner which is arbitrary or capricious. Id. at 90. "With the passage of
FLPMA, any supplemental forms of land use management, aside from withdrawals, that
would work a segregative effect upon mineral leasing should result from the land use
planning process." Id. (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (1982)); see also Mountain States Legal Found.
v. Andrus, 499 F. Supp. 383 (D. Wyo. 1980) (holding that the Department of Interior's policy
of refusing to act on oil and gas lease applications in a National Forest wilderness study area
constituted a defacto withdrawal in violation of FLPMA). For a thorough discussion of the
issue of public land withdrawals before and after FLPMA, see Peterson, supra, at 58-88.
22. Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441,1449 (9th Cir. 1988).
23. Over the years, numerous amendments to the Mineral Leasing Act modified the
provisions and applications of the Act. These amendments changed the initial prospecting
permit system to a competitive and noncompetitive leasing system that remains in effect
today. The Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Reform Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203,
Title 5,subtitle B, § 101(a), 30 U.S.C. §§ 181,187(a), 187(b), 188,191,195, 226(b)-(d), (f)-(h),
226-1, 226-3 (1994); 16 U.S.C. §3148 (1994) changed the simultaneous leasing system. All
lands must now be first offered for competitive bidding. Noncompetitive leases are available
only for lands previously offered competitively and for which no acceptable minimum bid
has been received. If no competitive offer is received within two years, the lands are again
subject to leasing only according to the competitive leasing process.
24. See generally 43 C.F.R. §§ 3120.1-3120.7-3 (1996).
25. 43 C.F.R. §§ 3101.1-3 (1996). "Any party submitting a bid... shall be deemed to have
agreed to stipulations applicable to the specific parcel as indicated in the List of Lands
Available for Competitive Nominations or the Notice of Competitive Lease Sale available
from the proper BLM office." Id.
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bonus, first year rentals and an administrative fee. 6 Rentals are paid on or
before the anniversary date of the lease for each year during its fixed term.
Once production is obtained, the lessee pays the United States a royalty on
the value of all production from or attributable to the lease.'
Oil and gas leases, including federal leases, are a unique hybrid of
contract and real property rights. On the one hand, the lease is a contract
meeting the contract formation requirements of offer, acceptance and
payment of consideration; providing remedies for breach and containing
terms both express and implied which govern each party's performance.'
In most jurisdictions, the same lease is also recognized as a grant of an
interest in real property.? An oil and gas lease is executed by the grantor in
favor of a named grantee, identifies the property subject to the grant,
contains present words of grant, and identifies any limitations on the
grant?° In many respects an oil and gas lease is far more analogous to a
deed than to the tenancy created by a commercial or residential lease of real
property.31
The granting clause of the lease causes the conveyance of the estate
from the lessor to the lessee. Under the express terms of a federal oil and
gas lease, the United States grants to the lessee the "exclusive right to drill
for, mine, extract, remove and dispose of all the oil and gas (except helium)
in the [described] lands... together with the right to build and maintain
improvements thereupon... ,.32The habendum clause of the lease conveys
the oil and gas interest for a primary term of years and for so long thereafter
as oil or gas is produced in paying quantities? The exclusive right to
develop the lease is bargained for and is an essential element of the lease.

26. 43 C.F.R. § 3120.5-2 (1996).
27. 43 C.F.R. § 3103.3.

28. See, e.g., Rosebud Coal Sales Co. v. Andrus, 667 F.2d 949, 951 (10th Cir. 1982);
Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Hickel, 317 F. Supp. 1192,1197 (D. Alaska 1970), affd, Standard
Oil Co. of Cal. v. Morton, 450 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1971).
29. See Terry v. Humphreys, 203 P. 539,540-542 (1922); see also Rock Island Oil & Ref.
Co. v. Simmons, 386 P.2d 239, 241 (N.M. 1963) (involving a federal lease).
30. See generally REO Indus., Inc. v. S.C. Natual Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 932 F.2d
447,452-53 (5th Cir. 1991); FDIC v. Hulsey, 22 F.3d 1472,1483-84 (10th Cir. 1994).
31. See Van Zant v. Heilman, 214 P.2d 864,870 (N.M. 1950) (the habendum clause of an
oil and gas lease distinguishes it from other types of leaseholds because it creates a fee
simple determinable estate which continues indefinitely until the occurrence of a condition
that causes the estate to terminate and revert back to the original owner).
32. 43 C.F.R. § 3101.1-2 (1996); see also U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Bureau of Land Mgmt.,
Offer to Lease and Lease for Oil and Gas, Form 3100-11b (Aug. 1988). This provision applies
only to the leasehold surface, and not to surface overlying adjoining leases. For a thorough
discussion of access to leaseholds, see 2 Charles L. Kaiser, Access to the Leaseholds, LAW OF
FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEAsS (1996). For the purposes of this article, access to the leasehold
itself is presumed.
33. 43 C.F.R. § 3135.1-5 (1996); see also43 C.F.R. § 3107.2-1 (1995).
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While the lease does not grant title to the oil and gas minerals in place, the
exclusive right to explore, remove and dispose of all the oil and gas in the
described lands granted under the terms of the lease conveys more than a
license or mere expectancy to develop the mineral resource.'
The right to develop also carries with it several implied
obligations. ' For example, the lessee is obliged to develop the lease with
reasonable diligence after discovery of oil or gas in paying quantities.' The
lessee has a duty to drill offset wells if reasonably necessary to prevent
drainage or pay compensatory royalty, drill wells on the lease in accordance
with state spacing restrictions, and prevent waste.37 Lastly, the lessee also
is subject to the implied covenant to market the oil or gas produced.3' In
determining whether a lessee has complied with these covenants, courts
traditionally have applied the reasonably prudent operator standard. 9
In a nut shell, during the term of a federal oil and gas lease or any
extension thereof, the lessor grants the lessee the express and implied rights
of ingress, egress and the right to use so much of the surface of the subject
lands as reasonably necessary for the exploration, development, processing,
storage and transportation of the oil and gas minerals subject only to
reasonable regulation consistent with these rights.40 It is this right of access
and present ability to reduce the subsurface minerals to possession that
gives the lease its value. 41 The importance of the lease rights granted

34. See Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Morton, 512 P.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1975).
35. See also U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Bureau of Land Mgmt., Offer to Lease and Lease
for Oil and Gas, form 3100-11b, § 4 (Aug. 1988); 43 C.F.R. § 3162.1(a) (1996). See generally
State ex rel. Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Worden, 103 P.2d 124 (N.M. 1940); Libby v. De Baca,
179 P.2d 263 (N.M. 1947); Darr v. Eldridge, 346 P.2d 1041 (N.M. 1959).
36. 43 C.FR. § 3162.2 (1996); see also U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Bureau of Land Mgmt.,
Offer to Lease and Lease for Oil and Gas, form 3100-11b, 5§ 3f, 4 (Aug. 1988).
37. SeA3 C.F.R. §§ 3100.2-2, 3162.2(a) (1996); see also Cone v. Amoco Prod. Co., 532 P.2d
590 (1975).
38. Sealso U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Bureau of Land Mgmt., Offer to Lease and Lease
for Oil and Gas, form 3100-11b, § 4 (Aug. 1988); 43 C.F.R § 3162.1(a) (1996). See generally
State ex rel. Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Worden, 103 P.2d 124 (N.M. 1940); Libby v. De Baca,
179 P.2d 263 (N.M. 1947); Darr v. Eldridge, 346 P.2d 1041 (1959).
39. See generally 5 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS, et al; WILiAMS & MEYERS OIL AND GAS LAW §
801-885 (1996). See also Clayton v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 150 F.Supp. 9 (D.N.M. 1957); Libby v.
De Baca, 179 P.2d 263 (N.M. 1947).
40. 43 C.F.R § 3101.1-2 (1996). See Del Rio Drilling Programs, Inc. v. United States, 35
Fed. Cl. 186 (1996), superceded by 37 Fed. Cl. 157 (1997); see also Kinney-Coastal Oil Co. v.
Kieffer, 277 U.S. 488 (1928); Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 492 F.2d 878,
883 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. dismissed, 419 U.S. 1097; Amoco Prod. Co. v. Carter Farms Co., 703
P.2d 894 (1985). See generally I HOWARD R.WILLAMS, et al., WILLUAhS & MEYERS OIL AND GAS
LAW S 202.1 (1996).
41. See Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1988) (discussing the limitations of a
no surface occupancy stipulation attached at lease issuance giving the agency absolute
authority to prohibit surface access). See generally Del Rio Drilling Programs, Inc. v. United
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becomes immediately apparent when viewed in light of Lucas v. South
CarolinaCoastal Council
C. Antecedent Inquiry Test
In Lucas, the South Carolina state legislature enacted legislation
which provided that new construction in the coastal zone constituted a
"nuisance" and therefore should be prohibited. 0 This legislation prevented
Lucas from constructing habitable structures similar to houses immediately
adjacent to his property on two lots which he had purchased for just that
purpose. 0 The United States Supreme Court held that a court, independent
of the justifications for a taking, should first look to the nature of the
owner's estate to determine whether "the proscribed use interests were not
part of his title to begin with."' The Court concluded that "[w]here the
State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economically
beneficial use,... it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent
inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use
interests were not part of his title to begin with."" This preliminary test,
which is frequently referred to as the "antecedent inquiry test," essentially
embodies the legal principal that where an owner's title is itself limited by
background principles of property law that would otherwise preclude the
use in question such use may be prohibited without compensation, even
though the owner is left without alternative economic uses. 47
It follows that any inquiry into a takings claim must begin with
determining whether property rights are at issue and if so, the nature and
scope of those rights. Because economic harm alone is insufficient to
establish a claim, a showing must be made that the government action
causing the economic harm "interfere[s] with interests that [are] sufficiently
bound up with the reasonable expectations of the claimant to constitute
'property' for Fifth Amendment purposes." 0

States, 35 Fed. CI. 186,195 (1996) ('of course, the 'right' to exploit the minerals would be
worthless without the additional right to access them').
42. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1027; Broughton Lumber Co. v. United States, 30 Fed. Cl. 239 (1994).
46. Lucas, 505 U.S.at 1027 (emphasis added).
47. M &J Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
53 (holding that M &J's acquisition of certain rights did not give it the right to mine in such
a way as to endanger the public health and safety); see also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n
v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 489 (1987). But see Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026 (reasoning that the
legislature's recitation of a noxious-use justification cannot be the basis for departing from
our categorical rule that total regulatory taking must be complete).
48. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,125 (1978).
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In determining the nature and scope of a protected property
interest, two important factors must be noted. First, property rights
originate outside the Constitution from sources such as state and federal
law. 4' Property then cannot be defined by the procedures adopted for its
deprivation.-s In this regard, government regulation of "property" is not
imposed in a vacuum. To meet constitutional muster, the nature of an
owner's interest must be defined outside the "takings" context. Secondly,
property rights cannot be redefined in order to avoid payment of just
compensation.'1 The danger of such a notion was emphasized by Justice
Holmes in PennsylvaniaCoal, where he opined that "if the protection against
physical appropriations of private property was to be meaningfully
enforced, the government's power to redefine the range of interests
included in the ownership of property was necessarily constrained by
constitutional limits." 2 For this reason, the government has the burden of
establishing that the proposed use would constitute a nuisance, 3 and may
not insulate itself from takings liability by simply "finding" that the activity
is a "nuisance" if it was not historically so characterized.'
For example, the United States Court of Federal Claims in Florida
Rock Industries,Inc. v. United Statesss held the nuisance exception to the Fifth
Amendment's requirement of just compensation inappropriate when
applied to rock mining of the type planned for plaintiff's property which
had never before been considered a nuisance.' In connection with this
holding, the court observed that "the assertion that a proposed activity
would be a nuisance merely because Congress chose to restrict, regulate or
prohibit it for the public benefit indicates circular reasoning that would
yield the destruction of the [F]ifth [Almendment.""
Moreover, the government cannot turn the antecedent inquiry "into
a threshold test that defines whether or not a property right exists."5' The

49.

See Ruckelhaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986,1001 (1984); see also Board of Regents v.

Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
50. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
51. See Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwitb, 449 U.S. 155,164 (1980).
52. Lucas, 505 US. 1003,1014 (1992) (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
at 414-15).

53. See Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. C. 37 (1994).
54. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1023-28.
55. 21 Cl. Ct. 161,168 (1990) [hereinafter Florida Rock III], vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
56.
57.

Id. at 167.
Id. at 168.

58. Store Safe Redlands Assoc. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 726, 733 (1996). The inquiry is not whether the owner's title is limited by law or regulation generally, but rather
whether background principles of property law "would otherwise preclude the use in
question...." Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
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importance of this distinction is particularly true in light of the fact that
some courts have held that purchase under a comprehensive regulatory
scheme may imply some limitation of the property interests at issue5 9 Any
such limitation, however, has been expressly linked with the lack of the
right to exclude rather than "the right" to be free from government
regulation.' Absent a right to exclusive possession, entry into a pervasively
regulated environment may carry with it the increased likelihood that
legitimate government action could adversely affect the value of
investments. 6' This argument is more closely related to the subsequent
determination of whether there has been a taking by implying a limitation
on the claimant's investment backed expectations rather than in undermining the existence of a protectable property interest in the first instance.'
III. ESTABLISHING THE RIGHT TO COMPENSATION
Possessing the antecedent property right in a federal oil and gas
lease allows a claimant to proceed to establish the right to compensation. To
do so, the claimant must show the takings claim is ripe and the
governments action is of the type which should not be solely borne by the

lessee.

59. See, e.g., M & J Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In California
Housing Securities,Inc. v. United States, 959 F.2d 955, 957-58 (Fed. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 324 (1992), the court held that voluntary participation in the pervasively regulated
banking business prevented plaintiff from demonstrating historically rooted expectation that
it could prevent government action or be compensated. The court reasoned that at the time
of the alleged taking, the plaintiff did not possess "the most valued property right in the
bundle of property rights, the right to exclusive possession or the right to exclude others."
Id. See also criticism of M &J Coa and CaliforniaHousing Securities by the Federal Circuit in
Preseaultv. United States, 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (where the court distinguished both
cases on the grounds that the government's action in enforcing otherwise valid laws to
control social conduct was distinguishable from circumstances in which an owner's use and
enjoyment of the property itself is at stake).
60. See Eastern Minerals Intl., Inc. v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 541, 549 (1996) (holding
that "[m]ere awareness that Eastern's permits could be affected by future regulations does
not destroy plaintiff's property interests").
61. See Golden PacificBancorp v. United States, 15 F.3d 1066,1074 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 420 (1994), where the court distinguished United Nuclear's uranium lease
from the interest represented by Golden Pacific's investment in the Bank. United Nuclear
possessed a reasonable investment-backed expectation because inherent in its respective
interest as a mineral lessee was the right to exclude others. See alsoUnited Nuclear Corp. v.
United States, 912 F.2d 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (prior regulations do not justify new and
unrelated regulations).
62. "The reasonableness of plaintiffs' investment backed expectations relates to whether
government regulation effected a taking of their property interest rather than whether
plaintiffs owned a compensable property interest." EasternMinerals, 36 Fed. Cl. at 549 (citing
Store Safe Redlands,35 Fed. Cl. 726, 734).
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A. Perfecting a Claim
For a taking claim to be "ripe," there must be a final agency
decision on the merits of the proposed development.6 This requirement
implies both the submission of an application which puts the relevant
regulative body on notice of a property owner's intent to develop and
receipt of a decision in response."
Several exceptions to both of these requirements exist. First, "it is
not necessary for a landowner to engage in a futile, pro forma exercise of
agency review when no possibility exists that a permit will be granted " "s or
where a regulation specifically prohibits development of identifiable
property if, for example, the enactment itself constitutes a taking of that

63. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340,351 (1986). Cf. Doctrine
of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies which is a basic principle of administrative law.
This doctrine requires that judicial review of the correctness of Interior Department actions
be maintained exclusively under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701706 (1996) and in the United States District Courts only after an appeal to the Interior Board
of Land Appeals. See 43 C.F.R. § 3000.4 (1996) (expressly granting an adminsitraive appeal
before the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA) to any person adversely affected by an
action or decision of the Interior Department); see also 43 C.F.R. § 4.1(b)(3) (1996). A final
IBLA decision must be obtained to challenge the validity of underlying action in federal
district court. See C.F.R. § 4.21(a) (1996); Doria Mining & Eng'g v. Morton, 608 F.2d 1255 (9th
Cir. 1979); 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1996); State v. Babbitt, 830 F. Supp. 586, 590 (D. Utah 1993);
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99,105-07 (1977). A suit brought under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.
must assume the underlying correctness of the administrative action and allege instead that
the underlying action absent compensation would be a taking. of private property in
violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Florida Rock Indus., Inc.
v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
64. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126-27 (1985). The
requirement that a person obtain a permit before engaging in a certain use of his or her
property does not itself "take" the property because the existence of a permit system implies
that permission may be granted, leaving the landowner free to use the property desired or
if the permit is denied, with other viable uses available to the owner. "Only when a permit
is denied and the effect of the denial is to prevent economically viable" use of the land in
question can it be said that a taking has occurred. But see Hage v.United States, 35 Fed. Cl.
147, 164 (1996) where the United States Court of Federal Claims has held that it is not
necessary to apply for a permit if the process is so burdensome or futile that it "effectively
deprives the property of value." See also Stearns Co. v. United States, 34 Fed. Cl. 264 (1995).
65. Broadwater Farms Joint Venture v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 232, 236 (1996) (citing

Parkview Corp. v. Dep't of the Army, 490 F. Supp. 1278 (E.D. Wis. 1980)) (where the
government's indication that a permit would not be granted foreclosed the need for applying
for a permit); Conant v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 689 (1987) (where the circumstances did not
indicate that applying for a permit would be futile). In short, a takings claim is ripe when the
issues are fit for judicial decision and hardships occur if the court declines to hear the claim.
Hage, 35 Fed. Cl. at 163 (citing Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967)).
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property." Secondly, where a property owner has received a final agency
decision which applies the suspect regulations in question to the property,
the owner need not file multiple applications and receive multiple denials!'
In the absence of a formal denial, "a taking may occur by reason of
'extraordinary delay' in governmental decision-making.. ."68 with the date
of taking to be determined by the Court after the delay becomes
unreasonable. 0 Upon receipt of a permit denial, approval or statutory
enactment which seems to amount to a denial or after what amounts to an
extraordinary delay, property owners can seek a determination of their
rights to just compensation."
B. Determining the Right to Compensation
In Pennsylvania Coal the United States Supreme Court noted that
"[glovernment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in
66. See Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 952 (1991). The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA), which
prohibited surface mining of alluvial valley floors, held a taking of property located in such
a valley. But see Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
A facial challenge to the constitutionality of SMCRA held not yet ripe because it did not
involve a challenge to the statute as applied to a particular parcel of property.
67. Whitney Benefits v. United States, 752 F.2d 1554, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See also
Loveladies Harbor,Inc. v. United States, 15 a. Ct. 381, 386 (1988), where the Court held that
a property owner need not seek successive denials prior to filing an action for inverse
condemnation.
68. Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 10 F.3d 796, 803 (Fed. Cir.1993); see also Eastern
Minerals, 36 Fed. Cl. at 548 (extraordinary delay in permit review process can result in
permanent taking without necessity of final agency action. Such delays result in constructive
denial that supplants final agency action).
69. Id.
70. Under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a), the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive
jurisdiction over all monetary damage claims in excess of $10,000 brought against the United
States. This would include takings claims of rights granted under a federal oil and gas lease.
The United States District Court has concurrent jurisdiction over claims under $10,000. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1346,1491(a). Takings claims must be brought within 6 years of the time the taking
occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 2501. It is important to note that the date of taking is often difficult to
determine and an intensely litigated issue. Property owners must be sensitive to this in the
context of the ripeness discussion above. Authority for agency action is a prerequisite for a
claim under the Tucker Act. See Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 899
(Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987). Simultaneous actions challenging the
legality of the permit denial in one jurisdiction and claiming compensation for the denial in
the Court of Federal Claims is allowable because the two claims seek entirely different relief.
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 27 F.3d 1545,1552 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc). No
challenge of the underlying decision is necessary to perfect a claim for monetary damages
in the Court of Federal Claims. Bass Enter. Prod., Inc. v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 615, 618

(1996).
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the general law."n Nevertheless, the Court explained while "some values
are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power
...the implied limitation must have its limits or the contract and due
process clauses are gone." 2 Justice Holmes warned that it is "the natural
tendency of human nature to extend the qualification [by the police power]
more and more until at last private property disappears. " ' Thus, on this
spectrum between unregulated use and regulations which in effect prohibit
all use, the right to compensation must be established. Out of the bevy of
cases that guide courts confronted with determining whether there has been
a taking "what emerges is at least the basic notion that the government,
under the guise of regulation, cannot take from a property owner the core
economic value of property, leaving the owner with a mere shell of
shambled expectations. "74
The United States Supreme Court has identified three factors which
have "particular significance" in making the determination: (1) "the
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant"; (2) "the extent to which
the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations";
(3) "the character of the governmental action."' Each factor merits further
discussion.
C. Economic Impact of the Regulation
The economic impact of a regulation is measured by comparing the
fair market value of the property before and after the alleged date of
taking. 6 It calls for a property owner to show serious financial loss in order
"to ensure that every restraint imposed by government to adjust the
competing demands of private owners would not result in a takings
claim. ,77In consideration of this factor, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit has summarized Lucas as teaching that economic impact "alone may
be determinative."' 8 According to Lucas,
[i]f a regulation categorically prohibits all economically
beneficial use of land-destroying its economic value for
private ownership-the regulation has an effect equivalent to

71. Pennsylvania Coal,260 U.S. at 413.
72. Id.
73.

Id. at 415.

74. Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364,1373 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
75. Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224 (1986) (citing Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1979)).
76. Loveladies Harbor,28 F.3d at 1180.
77. Id.
78. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560,1564 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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a permanent physical occupation. There is, without more, a
compensable taking.
If, however, a regulation prohibits less than all economically
beneficial use of the land and causes at most a partial
destruction of its value, the case does not come within the
Supreme Court's "categorical' taking rule."
As a practical matter, though, Lucas left unanswered several
important questions. First, how much value must an owner lose to
constitute loss of "all" economically beneficial use and when does the
partial loss of economic use of the property cross the line from a
noncompensable "mere diminution in value" to a compensable taking.'
Second, how does a court arrive at the appropriate denominator for use in
determining whether there has been a categorical taking. The determination
of whether there has been a loss of "all" economically beneficial use is
directly tied to the identification of the appropriate denominator or relevant
parcel against which to measure the denial.'
Each of these questions has been preliminarily addressed to some
extent by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Refusing to adopt any bright line test, the courts' decisions in FloridaRock Industrie 2 and Loveladies Harbor' both point to rather intensive factual inquiries grounded firmly in traditional notions of property law.
1. PartialTakings Compensable Under Fifth Amendment
Recognizing that a regulatory imposition that results in a mere
diminution in the value of property is not compensables the court in Florida
Rock Industries went on to address the real question at issue: can government avoid compensation by limiting a regulation's effect to something less
than a taking of all of the use, enjoyment and value of the property at
issue?' The court held that
[niothing in the Fifth Amendment limits its protection to only
'categorical' regulatory takings, nor has the Supreme Court or
this Court so held. Thus there remains in cases such as this
the difficult task of resolving when a partial loss of economic
use of the property has crossed the line from a non-

79. Id.
80. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8.
81. Id. at 1016 n.7.
82. Florida Rock Indus., Inc., 18 F.3d 1560.
83. Loveladie$ Harbor,28 F.3d at 1176.
84. In Deltona Corp. v.United States, 657 F.2d 1184,1193 (Ct. Cl. 1981), the court focused
on the uses the regulations permitted and whether given a present economic use the
remaining value was sufficient to defeat a takings claim.
85. FloridaRock Indus., Inc., 18 F.3d at 1560.
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'mere diminution' to a compensable 'partial
compensable
taking'."
The Court reasoned that marketplace decisions should be made
under the working assumption that the Government will neither prejudice
private citizens, unfairly shifting the burden of a public good onto a few
people, nor act arbitrarily or capriciously, that is, will not act to disappoint
reasonable investment backed expectations. The Government, in a word,
must act fairly and reasonably, so that private parties can pursue their
interests. At the same time, when Government acts as the intermediary
between private interests to provide a mutually beneficial environment
from which all benefit and in which all can thrive, the shared diminution
and free choice that results may not rise to a level of constitutionally
required compensation. 7
The FloridaRock court identified several areas for consideration
when the impact of a regulation resulted in a partial but not total denial of
economically beneficial use of the property. These areas included whether
direct compensating benefits flowing from the regulatory environment were
accruing to the property, and others similarly situated; whether benefits, if
any, were general and widely shared through the community and the
society, while the costs are focused on a few; and whether the alternative
permitted activities were economically realistic in light of the setting and
circumstances, and were realistically available.88
2.

Taking of the Parcel as a Whole

In Penn Central TransportationCo. v. City of New York," the United
States Supreme Court stated that "'[t]aking' jurisprudence does not divide
a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether
rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated."' ° Instead, the
Court stated that it considers the nature and extent of governmental
interference with the "parcel as a whole."' When New York City denied the
owner's request to build an office building on top of the famous terminal
based on the fact that the terminal had been designated a city landmark, the
owner challenged the denial as an unconstitutional taking.' The Supreme
Court refused to treat the air rights separately from the underlying land."

86. Id. at 1570.
87. Id. at 1571.
88. Id.
89. 438 U.S. 104,130-31.

90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 130.
Id. at 130-31.
Id. at 119"
Id. at 136-38.
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Looking at the terminal as an entire parcel, the Court found no taking
because the law did not completely interfere with the owner's present use
of the property and the pre-existing air rights were transferable to the
owner's other parcels in the city."
The Lucas court has since questioned the Penn Central "parcel as a
whole" analysis. In Lucas, the Court explained that
"[tihe answer to this difficult question [of relevant parcel]
may lie in how the owner's reasonable expectations have been
shaped by the State's law of property-i.e., whether and to
what degree the State's law has accorded legal recognition
and protection of the particular interest in land with respect
to which the takings claimant 'alleges a diminution in, or
elimination of, value. " 95
After Lucas, the Federal Circuit considered the relevant parcel
question in Loveladies Harbor,Inc. v. United States. There, the Court declined
to adopt a bright line rule that the denominator of the takings fraction is
always that parcel for which the owner seeks a permit in favor of "a flexible
approach designed to account for factual nuances."' Factors relevant for
consideration include geographic continuity, temporal development
parameters, and the effect of disparate regulatory treatment on essential
attributes of ownership.' The nature and type of the property affected also
merit consideration.' In the absence of a complete denial of all economically
beneficial use and a categorical takin& these types of factors must be
considered by the trial court as part of its analysis in a determination that
government action has resulted in a taking.
D. The Character of Government Action
Prior to Lucas, this criterion called for a court to balance the liberty
interest of the private property owner against the Government's need to
protect the public interest through the imposition of the restraint."9
According to the Federal Circuit, the effect of Lucas was to dramatically
change examination of the character of the governmental action from an ad
hoc balancing process to a situation in which state property law,
incorporating common law nuisance doctrine, controls. In short, the trial
court must consider whether the proposed use is contained within the scope

94. Id.
95. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
96. 28 F.3d 1171,1181.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1176.
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of the government's power to regulate under common law nuisance." "If
the regulation prevents what would or legally could have been a nuisance,
then no taking occurred. The State merely acted to protect the public under
its inherent police powers."n
E. Interference with Distinct Investment Backed Expectations
Consideration of this criterion "was a way of limiting takings
recoveries to owners who could demonstrate that they bought their
property in reliance on a state of affairs that did not include the challenged
regulatory regime.""3 This argument is usually first raised in the context of
the antecedent inquiry test. To the extent the interest is found to qualify for
protection, it is frequently argued that the use interest does not give rise to
reasonable investment backed expectation."° General regulation of the
property in question, however, does not give way to a complete
abandonment of investment backed expectations. Such expectations are
formed just as readily by past use consistent with applicable regulation and
do not require an absence of regulation to be compensable. 1" For example,
generally speaking, the requirement that a person obtain a development
permit does not "take" property."° The expectancy of a permit under the
regulatory scheme plays a central role in this conclusion.1" Additionally, the
assertion of regulatory jurisdiction does not constitute a regulatory taking.
It follows then that the mere existence of a specific regulatory scheme or
general regulatory jurisdiction should not prevent a property owner from
possessing reasonable investment backed expectations.

100. Id. at 1179.
101. Eastern Minerals, 36 Fed. Cl. at 551 (citing Creppel v. United States, 41 F.3d 627, 631
(Fed. Cir. 1994)).
102. Loveladies Harbor,28 F.3d at 1177.
103. "Inlegal terms, the owner who bought with knowledge of the restraint could be said
to have no reliance interest, or to have assumed the risk of any economic loss. In economic
terms, it could be said that the market had already discounted for the restraint, so that a
purchaser could not show a loss in his investment attributable to it." Id.
104. EasternMinerals, 36 Fed. Cl. at 550. Although plaintiffs' leases were subject to the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act ("SMCRA"), 30 U.S.C. § 1201-1328 (1994),
plaintiffs reasonably relied on the two permits they received under SMCRA when they
invested in the property and "leased the property in reliance on a state of affairs that did not
include the definition of adverse effect that formed the basis of the permit denial." Id. at 551.
105. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121,127 (1985).
106. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,293-97 (1981).
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IV. COMPENSATION AND FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASES
A. Bass EnterprisesProductionCo. v. United States:1 7 Applying the Ad
Hoc Factual Inquiry Test-Post Lucas to a Federal Oil and Gas Lease.
In Bass, the BLM denied eight Applications for Permits to Drill
(APD) filed by Bass to directionally drill and develop their federal oil and
gas lease rights under the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in Eddy
County, New Mexico. The United States had condemned the surface and
the initial 6,000 feet subsurface in 1977 for construction of WIPP as a facility
for the Department of Energy to store low level nuclear waste.' 9 In 1992,
Congress passed the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act to withdraw the
condemned land from the public domain for waste disposal and to establish
a regulatory framework to govern the site."' The Act generally prohibited
drilling through and underneath the site from outside the withdrawn lands
but exempted plaintiffs' prior existing rights."' Under the Act, plaintiffs'
rights were not to be affected unless the EPA determined that plaintiffs'
rights should be acquired in order for WIPP to comply with EPA's final
disposal regulations."' As of the date of filing of the complaint, Bass could
not drill because BLM had denied its APDs and EPA had not determined
whether the leases should be acquired in order for DOE to comply with the
final transuranic waste disposal regulations which were not ever
promulgated until after commencement of trial."' The Court of Federal
Claims held that BLM's denial of plaintiffs' APDs constituted a "taking" of
their property interests."' In so holding, the court examined the three
criteria set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Penn Central and
further developed in Lucas." 5 ,
First the Court of Federal Claims recognized the severe economic
impact that results when a mineral lessee is prohibited from accessing and
reducing minerals to possession.1 6 The court noted that the denials required

107. 35 Fed. C. 615. This case has been appealed by the United States to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The central issue on appeal is whether the Court
was correct in finding a permanent, as opposed to temporary, taking under the facts of this
case.
108. See id. at 617.
109. See id. at 616.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See Bass, 35 Fed. Cl. at 616.
113. See id. at 617.
114. See id. at 620.
115. See id. at 618.
116. See id. at 619.
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the lessees leave the property in its substantially natural state.11 7 The court
held this imposition affected the plaintiff and any future purchasers from
plaintiff'" In considering the character of the government's action, the Bass
court applied principles regarding basic notions of property law to the
rights under a federal oil and gas lease. The court concluded that there was
no evidence presented by the United States that "adjacent land owners
could have prevented plaintiffs drilling under the law of private nuisance
or [that] the state could have prevented the use under its power to abate
"..."'9
Finally, the investment backed expectations of the
nuisances .
plaintiffs indicated that they had relied on the lease rights granted which
included the right to develop the lease as proposed by Bass. The court
explained that "this criterion limits takings recoveries to plaintiffs who can
show the plaintiffs 'bought their property in reliance on a state of affairs
that did not include the challenged regulatory regime'."" The court did not
adopt the view that the mere existence of a regulatory scheme automatically
prohibited investment based expectations or allowed for an infinite
expansion of regulation explaining that "[allthough regulations and lease
provisions governed the property none prohibited plaintiff's drilling
entirely."1" Plaintiff's expectations were reasonable despite the regulations
and lease provisions. Knowledge of a general regulatory scheme did not
justify regulations inconsistent with lease rights granted.22
B. Guiding Principles for Regulatory Takings of Federal Oil and Gas
Lease Rights
The Bass decision is important for several reasons, the most
important of which is its straightforward analysis of the lease rights granted
and its rejection of the government's argument that it could make a final
decision "not to decide" whether to allow development and still claim not
to have effected valid existence of those lease rightsY3 In this way, the court
illuminated guiding principles for future consideration of unanswered
questions relating to the regulatory taking of federal oil and gas lease rights
on issues such as perfecting a claim, recognizing fundamental attributes of
ownership, partial takings and the relevant parcel. Each of these topics
merits discussion in context of related authority which would further
inform a court's consideration of such issues.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See Bass, 35 Fed. C1. at 619.
Id.
Id. at 620.
See id. (citingLoveladies, 28 F.3d at 1177).
See id.
See Bass, 35 Fed. C. at 620.
See id. at 619.
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1. Perfecting a Claim
While a federal oil and gas lease gives the lessee the "exclusive right
to drill for, mine, extract, remove and dispose of all the oil and gas," no
drilling may be commenced without prior BLM approval of an application
for permit to drill.1 Upon receipt of an APD, the regulations provide BLM
with three basic choices to either (1) approve, (2) deny or (3) advise the
applicant of the reasons why final action will be delayed along with the date
such final action can be expected."z Clearly, BLM's denial of an APD is
sufficient to ripen a claim for inverse condemnation as a result of the denial.
More troublesome is the potential for inordinate regulatory delay. Several
factors, therefore, must control an analysis of whether or not a mineral
lessee has perfected a claim despite BLM's decision to delay.
Implicitly, governmental delay contemplates the time reasonably
necessary to complete a decision and therefore contemplates ongoing consideration of the proposed conduct of operations. To the extent "delays" are
final decisions not to decide" or are made final contingent on other decision makers2 7 or upon other unrelated factors," such decisions to "delay"
should be challengeable as a sufficiently final decision giving rise to a
potential claim for liability. Under these circumstances, the decision to delay
is itself a final decision that may result in the taking of essential lease rights
granted. Moreover, in situations where BLM adopts interpretative policies
with respect to certain whole categories of APDs, a sufficient showing of
such a pattern should allow mineral lessees to perfect a claim absent
multiple permits and multiple denialsY0 Finally, while the requirement that
a property owner seek a permit may not generally give rise to a takings

124. .43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-1(c) (1996).

125. 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-1(h)(1-3) (1996).
126. In Eastern MineralsInt'l, Inc. v. UnitedStates, 36 Fed. Cl. 541 (1996), "the Plaintiffs
based their takings claim on a theory of extraordinary government delay that rendered their
lease valueless.' Id. at 548. "The Government recognizes that courts have found delay to be
a basis for temporary takings, but never for a permanent taking.' Id. The Court held that
"[elxtraordinary delay in the permit review process can result in a permanent taking without
the necessity of final agency action.' Id. The Court reasoned that "[w]ere defendant's theory
to prevail, the Government could withhold action on a permit indefinitely and avoid liability
for a taking. The Government would have no incentive to consider a permit application in
a timely manner." Id.
127. See, e.g., United Nuclear Corp. v. United States, 912 F.2d 1432,1434 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
128. See generally Bass, 35 Fed. Cl. at 618.
129. 'The futility exception serves *to protect property owners from being required to
submit multiple applications when the manner in which the first application was rejected
makes it clear that no project will be approved." EasternMinerals,36 Fed. Cl. at 547 (quoting
Southern Pacific v. Los Angeles, 922 P.2d 498, 504 (9th Cir. 1990)). The Court held that
Eastern did not need to submit permits for each and every tract included in its takings claim
where the government's position was clear in response to the first application. Id.
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claim, clearly the permit process itself cannot be used by the regulatory
agency to take property such as might occur if a "delay" prevented the
lessee from performing under the terms of the lease or otherwise caused the
lease to expire for lack of production at the end of the primary term.
2. Recognizing the Right of Access
There are no known cases where a categorical taking as described
by the United States Supreme Court in Lucas has been found in the context
of a federal oil and gas lease. Prior to Lucas, though, other courts have held
that prohibition of the only use of mineral rights or denial of access
constitute compensable takings.' In Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States,"
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld a decision
by the Claims Court which held "the only property here involved is the
right to surface mine a particular deposit of coal. The only possible use of
that right is to surface mine that coal."' 32 The Federal Circuit upheld the
Claims Court's finding that the prohibition of surface mining of Benefits'
coal, "deprive[d] Benefits of 'all economically viable uses of its property'
and destroy[ed] its value."" Of all the attributes of ownership to be
considered in determining whether governmental action has denied a
federal oil and gas lessee all economically beneficial use of the lease, the
most important is the regulation or decision's impact on the lessee's right
of surface access on the lease. The right to exclusive access is in actuality the
central lease right granted." In other contexts, regulation or governmental
action which eliminates or severely burdens essential attributes of
ownership have been regarded with greater suspicion."3 Given the
importance of the right of access to give effect to the granting clause, similar
consideration is warranted in cases where oil and gas lease rights are at
issue. This is particularly true where the lease contains no stipulations upon
which to justify prohibiting access."
The distinction between reasonable regulation and agency action
inconsistent with the lease rights granted was studied in Sierra Club v.

130. Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 952 (1991); Foster v. United States, 607 F.2d 943, 949 (Cl. Ct. 1979) (The United
States' "continued refusal of access to the [mineral] deposits constituted a taking within the
Fifth Amendment for which [the owners) are entitled to compensation.").
131. 926 F.2d at 1169.
132. Id. at 1172.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See Kaiser-Aetna v. United States, 444 US. 164,179-80 (1979) (holding the right to
exclude others an essential attribute of ownership); see also Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 71516 (1987) (ability to transfer property to one's heirs an essential right).
136. "The authorized officer may require stipulations as conditions of lease issuance."
43 C.F.R. § 3101.1-3 (1996).
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Peterson3' and Conner v. Burford."8 Both cases considered this distinction in
determining at what stage in the oil and gas leasing process an environmental impact statement was required under NEPA.P39 Two categories of
leases were primarily considered. One category included leases with nonsurface occupancy (NSO) stipulations attached prior to lease issuance (NSO
leases). The other category included leases where such stipulations were not
attached (non-NSO leases) . 4° The Conner court concluded that "sale of nonNSO leases entailed an irrevocable commitment of land to significant
surface disturbing activities, including drilling and roadbuilding, and that
such a commitment could not be made under NEPA without an EIS."141 The
court reasoned that the sale of a non-NSO lease did not reserve to the
government the absolute right to prevent all surface-disturbing activity.'4
The court's decision was premised on the fact that the government's right
to take reasonable measures to minimize adverse impacts to other resource
values, land uses or users not addressed in lease stipulations must be
consistent with the lease rights granting surface access. 4 The government's
authority to reasonably regulate surface disturbing activities was, therefore,
not a sufficient basis upon which to prohibit surface access inconsistent with
express provisions of the standard lease form." Prohibiting access to a
federal oil and gas lease causes the loss of an essential attribute of
ownership and prevents the lessee from the only real economic use of the
property. It follows that in circumstances requiring the owner to forego all
economically beneficial use of its property, there is the "heightened risk that
private property is being pressed into some form of public service under the
guise of mitigating serious public harm."145

137. 717 F.2d 1409,1412-15 (D.C. Cr. 1983) ("We must decide whether the government's
right to regulate, rather than preclude, surface-disturbing activities protects the forest environment.... "). Id. at 1449.

138. 848 P.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1988).
139. Id. at 1446.
140. Id. at 1447-49.
141. Id. at 1449 (citing SierraClub, 717 F.2d at 1414-15).

142. Id.
143. Id. See also 43 C.F.R. § 3101.1-2 (1996).
144. Conner, 848 F.2d at 1449-50. The mere existence of a "stipulation" is also not
controlling. A stipulation is a contract to which the general rules of contract interpretation
apply. United States v. Ideal Cement Co., Inc,, 5 IBLA 235,241 (1972), afd, 542 F.2d 1364 (9th
Cir. 1976). The stipulation must be considered as a whole with each provision given a
reasonable meaning and none left useless. ITT Arctic Services, Inc. v. United States, 524 F.2d
680, 684 (Ct. Cl. 1975). In Conner and Peterson, one of the mitigation stipulations used
specifically limited government control over post-leasing activities to reasonable regulations
which are consistent with oil and gas development and production. 848 F.2d at 1449.
145. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018.
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3. PartialTakings - The Reasonably PrudentOperatorStandard
Bearing in mind that the only real "use" connected with ownership
of an oil and gas lease is the ability to access the sub-surface minerals and
that absent a surface occupancy stipulation in a lease that provides for
direct surface access to the sub-surface, the question of partial takings of oil
and gas lease rights fundamentally revolves around how far away can the
surface location be moved from that sought by the lessee and what drilling
restrictions can be imposed before development becomes uneconomic or
technically infeasible.
The lease form and regulations contemplate that in addition to lease
stipulations and nondiscretionary statutes a lessee's surface use rights are
also subject to such reasonable measures as may be required by the
authorized officer to minimize adverse impacts to other resource values,
land uses or users not addressed in the lease stipulations at the time
operations are proposed.'" Reasonable measures must be consistent with
the lease rights granted and may include, but are not limited to,

146. 43 C.F.R. § 3101.1-2 (1995); see also U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Bureau of Land Mgmt.,
Offer to Lease and Lease for Oil and Gas, form 3100-11b, § 6 (Aug. 1988):
Section 6. Conduct of Operations - Lessee shall conduct operations in a
manner that minimizes adverse impacts to the land, air, and water, to
cultural, biological, visual, and other resources, and to other land uses or
users. Lessee shall take reasonable measures deemed necessary by lessor
to accomplish the intent of this section. To the extent consistent with the
lease rights granted, such measures may include, but are not limited to,
modification to siding or design of facilities, timing of operations, and
specification of interim and final reclamation measures. Lessor reserves the
right to continue existing uses and to authorize future uses upon or in the
leased lands, including the approval of easements or right-of-way. Such
uses shall be conditioned so as to prevent unnecessary or unreasonable
interference with the rights of the lessee.
BLM's interpretation of this specific lease clause was published in
Federal Register, Vol. 49, No. 77, pp. 15,641-15,643 on Thursday, April 19,
1984. The notice was published in conjunction with the BLM's publishing
of Lease Form No. 3100-11 which became effective July 1,1984. This notice
provided BLM's response to comments regarding various sections of the
lease generally and Section 6 specifically.
Several commentators were concerned that the language in Section 6
would provide the United States authority to prohibit reasonable
operations on a leasehold. It was believed that if the language were
interpreted to the extreme, a lessee would be severely limited with respect
to use of the surface. This was not the intent of the Bureau of Land
.Management in drafting this section. Accordingly, the language has been
revised to specify that requirements placed on lessees, through operations
of this lease term, must be consistent with the lease rights granted.
49 Fed. Reg. 15,641,15,642-43 (1984).
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"modification to siting or design of facilities, timing of operations and
specification of interim and final reclamation measures."" Specifically, the
regulations recognize that
[a]t a minimum measures shall be deemed consistent with
lease rights granted provided that they do not: require
relocation of proposed operations by more than 200 meters;
require that operations be sited off the leasehold; or prohibit
new surface disturbing operations for a period in excess of 60
days in any lease year.'4
While the "200 meter/60 day rule" provides some indication of what BLM
recognizes to be reasonable surface use restrictions, it clearly does not
address circumstances where restrictions are imposed consistent with the
regulation but which would render lease operations uneconomical or
technically infeasible." Essentially at issue then is whether restrictions
imposed which render lease operations uneconomical or technically
infeasible result in a taking of lease rights granted.
In considering these circumstances, the reasonably prudent
operator standard must control the determination of whether conditions
short of absolute prohibition placed on development are fundamentally
inconsistent with the lease rights granted. As discussed above, the
reasonably prudent operator standard traditionally has been applied to
determine whether the operator has complied with all the obligations
expressed and implied under the terms of the lease vis-a-vis the lessor." °
Similarly, it is this standard which must control when considering whether
the economic burdens placed on development constitute a taking. In other
words, to the extent the movement of the surface location compromises the
planned development making it technically infeasible so that no reasonably
prudent operator would conduct operations under the circumstances, a
partial taking should result. Similarly, should the BLM impose specific
conditions of approval which make drilling the well itself uneconomic for

147. Id.
148. Id.
149. On December 3,1991, the BLM Director adopted Instruction Memorandum No. 9267 (IM 9267) to clarify its interpretation of the 200 meter/60 day rule. For a thorough
discussion of these matters, see Charles L. Kaiser & Scott W. Hart, Surface Use Regulation
of Federal Oil and Gas Leases: Exploring the Limits of Administrative Discretion, 38 ROCKY
MTN. NUN. L. INST. 19-1, 19-28 through 31 (1992) (concluding that "while the BLM may

impose surface use restrictions exceeding the 200 meter/60 day rule that are not provided
for in stipulations, it may do so only in very limited circumstances after providing
substantial documentation supporting its decision." In circumstances where the surface use

restriction would render lease operations uneconomic or technically infeasible, acceptance
of due degradation would be necessary for management of the oil and gas resource.).
150. See discussion supra II.B. generally and supra note 31 specifically.
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a reasonably prudent operator, a partial taking should result. This is true
because the mere existence of an approved use alone cannot mitigate
against regulations which single out the development in question and while
potentially benefiting the public at large are borne in such circumstances
solely by the lessee."s
4. Relevant Parcel - Post IssuanceRedrawing of Lease Boundaries"sz
Finally, in considering the relevant parcel question in the context of
a federal oil and gas lease, attention must be paid to attempts by the United
States to redraw lease boundaries after a lease has been issued. Prior to
lease issuance, the United States has complete and unfettered discretion to
determine the lease boundaries. After lease issuance, the expectations of the
lessee for development are fully controlled by production related functions
subject only to reasonable regulation. For example, more often than not the
sub-surface mapping of a potential geologic prospect bears little
relationship to the surface use. Oil and gas leases then place surface
parameters on the lessee's ability to translate a sub-surface geologic concept
into actual production. To redefine a lease boundary post lease issuance and
especially after exploration or production has substantiated the sub-surface
geology is contrary to the lessee's investment backed expectations and
tantamount to a physical occupation of the property." This is particularly
true because under a federal oil and gas lease the minerals which are not
produced revert back to the United States.' While the United States may
choose to forego any royalty which would be generated from lands carved
out of an existing lease, it should not be able to require the same of a lessee
absent just compensation.
Additionally, the Supreme Court in Lucas indicated that the answer
to the question of the relevant parcel also involves consideration of the
owner's reasonable expectations as shaped by state or other relevant
property law.1" Historically, state case law and regulation have recognized
well spacing requirements for various stratigraphic depths as fundamental

151. Cf. FloridaRock Indus. Inc., 18 F.3d at 1570.
152. The relevant parcel issue has not been specifically addressed in the context of a
federal oil and gas lease. Almost all of the recent lower court opinions arose in the context
of wetlands and the denial of § 404 fill permits required in certain circumstances by the
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1387 (1994).
153. Moreover, courts have recognized that the physical occupation category includes
situations in which the government effectively takes title, possession, or denies owners use
of their land. See e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (finding a
navigational servitude imposed on a private marina to be compensable); Sheldon v. United
States, 7 F.3d 1022 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (finding a valid mortgage was appropriated when the
underlying property was forfeited to the United States).
154. See discussion supra LB.
155. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
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to the protection of correlative rights and prevention of waste of oil and gas
resources." The well spacing regulations establish the minimum acreage
that must be dedicated to a well and the location of the well within a
governmental subdivision of a section.157 The purpose of such regulations
is to avoid physical waste of the oil and gas resources and economic waste
by drilling more wells than are necessary for maximum resource
recovery.I' Since spacing is determined by the drainage radius of a typical
well producing from a particular formation, an oil and gas lessee's
expectation therefore is bound up in the context of engineering principles
and the related regulations which provide for the maximum development
of the reservoir.
Needless to say, this system requires that some oil and gas be left
in place to insure the protection of correlative rights and the prevention of
waste. Such restrictions, though, have been historically recognized as
conveying a mutual benefit by applying a mutual burden on adjoining
mineral lessees.15' Regulations, however, which would prohibit
development of identifiable spacing units and require that those resources
be left in their natural state inevitably single out specific lessees and
appropriate identifiable resources in total. Under such circumstances, it
cannot be similarly said that the prohibiting of development works both as
a benefit and burden to the lessee."W Even if a spacing unit is part of a larger
lease, the complete prohibition of development is inconsistent with the
expectations engendered by a reasonable reliance on regulations of the
industry that have developed over the course of years to protect both
resource owners and lessees adequately. "[W]hen no productive or
economically beneficial use of land is permitted, it is less realistic to indulge
our usual assumption that the legislature is 'simply adjusting the benefits

156. See New Mexico Oil Conservation Division Rule 501.
157. See 8 WILLIAMS & MEYERS OIL AND GAS LAW (1996).
158.

See 8 WiLLIAMs & MEERS OIL AND GAS LAw, MANUAL OF OIL AND GASTERMS, WELL-

SPACING (definition citing Robert E. Hardwicke, 31 TEX. L. REv. 99 at 111 (1952)); N.M. STAT,
ANN. §§ 70-2-2, 70-2-3 (Michie Repl. Pamph. 1995)); New Mexico Oil Conservation Division
Rules 501-604.
159. When there is reciprocity of advantage, paradigmatically in a zoning case. See, for
example, Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 US. 365 (1926), then the claim that the Government
has taken private property has little force; the claimant has in a sense been compensated by
the public program 'adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
common good." Penn Central,438 US. at 124. Thus, shared economic impacts resulting from

certain types of land use controls have been held to be non-compensable. Agins v. Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255 (1980) (shared 'benefits and burdens of a zoning ordinance); Penn Central,438

U.S. 104 at 131 (same).
160. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017 (citing San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S.
at 652 (Brennan, J. dissenting) (total deprivation of beneficial use is, from the landowner's
point of view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation)).
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and burdens of economic life' in a manner that secures an 'average
reciprocity of advantage' to everyone concerned."' 61
V. LESSOR REGULATOR - A CONSISTENT VIEW
When the United States enters the arena of mineral lessors, it
fundamentally commits its minerals to development. While reasonable
regulation is certainly contemplated, the granting clause of a federal oil and
gas lease issued pursuant to the MLA transfers an interest in property
which is protected by the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. Given the constitutional dictates of limited powers and its
protection of individual liberties to include property rights, the
grantor/grantee relationship must be validated in the Court of Federal
Claims when conflict between government's multiple roles presents itself
in the form of a takings claim.
Toward this end, determination of the nature and extent of the lease
rights granted must be made at the time of the grant. Post issuance
regulations or regulatory decisions should not be allowed to defeat the
grant by denying all or substantially all economically beneficial use as a
substitute for stipulations not imposed at the time of the grant. Nor can oil
and gas exploration itself on lands subject to a valid existing lease newly be
deemed a "nuisance" to prevent liability for taking. As noted by the Court
in Lucas, "the distinction between regulation that 'prevents harmful use'
and that which 'confers benefits' is difficult, if not impossible, to discern on
an objective, value-free basis."' 62 If this distinction is to be made at all, it
should be made prior to lease issuance. In a system of limited government,
the United States should not be able to avoid its obligations by revising the
lease rights granted any more than a private mineral lessor who later
regrets granting of the lease. A simple example stripped of highly charged
environmental issues is instructive on this point. Should the United States
decide retroactively to increase its royalty, there would be little doubt that
such a decision would be treated as absurd. Why then should retroactive
non-surface occupancy stipulations be categorized differently?
Both decisions could under certain circumstances be justified as
being for the public good and both would result in rewriting lease
provisions. It is axiomatic that ordinary police powers protect the public
and private lessors from lessee/operator malfeasance. In contrast, the
stipulations attached to the lease, restrictions derived from specific
nondiscretionary statutes, regulations and lease terms protect the public by
providing for reasonable regulation of surface access not inconsistent with

161.
162.

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017-18 (citations omitted).
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026.
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the lease rights granted. To construe these federal regulatory powers in
such a way as to in effect rewrite lease terms regarding surface access is to
go significantly beyond any non-compensable use of such powers. This is
particularly true where the nature and extent of the grant is completely
within the discretion of the BLM.
In short, the government's role as regulator cannot be used to
redefine a lessee's property rights at some date where hindsight may
indicate that they were less than providently granted. In this regard, Justice
Holmes recognized in PennsylvaniaCoa," that it was "the natural tendency
of human nature to extend the qualification [by the police power] more and
more until at last private property disappears,"1" and emphasized in this
context that "if the protection against physical appropriations of private
property was to be meaningfully enforced, the government's power to
redefine the range of interests included in the ownership of property was
necessarily constrained by constitutional limits.""

163.
164.
165.

260 U.S. 393 (1922).
Id. at 415.
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. at 1014 (citing Pennsylvania Coal

Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414-15).

